Applying the U.S. Constitution Abroad, from the Era of the U.S. Founding to the Modern Age by Alina Veneziano
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 46
Number 3 Remodeling Sanctuary: Urban Immigration
in a New Era
Article 4
2019
Applying the U.S. Constitution Abroad, from the
Era of the U.S. Founding to the Modern Age
Alina Veneziano
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alina Veneziano, Applying the U.S. Constitution Abroad, from the Era of the U.S. Founding to the Modern Age, 46 Fordham Urb. L.J. 602
(2019).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol46/iss3/4
 602 
APPLYING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ABROAD, 
FROM THE ERA OF THE U.S. FOUNDING TO 
THE MODERN AGE 
Alina Veneziano* 
ABSTRACT 
This Essay traces the extent to which constitutional protections 
have been extended to foreign nationals within or outside the 
territory of the United States, as well as to U.S. nationals abroad.  
The United States Supreme Court’s metric for making such 
determinations has evolved. Early analyses were grounded in 
considerations reflective of strict territorialism and citizenship. 
However, technology and globalization have challenged the 
traditional notion that the Constitution applies only to those within 
the United States.  The question of whether the Constitution follows 
its citizens when they enter foreign territory has been hotly debated, 
particularly as the Supreme Court has struggled to answer questions 
implicating the United States-Mexico border and Guantanamo Bay.  
It seems not only fair and equitable, but also logical, that such 
constitutional guarantees be afforded to U.S. nationals when not 
within United States territory. But on what criteria should such 
determinations be based? 
This Essay traces case law on the extraterritorial applicability of 
the U.S. Constitution and criticizes the Supreme Court’s failure in the 
Hernandez decision to dispel inconsistencies and loopholes. In doing 
so, this Essay sets forth a  modified approach that would accomplish 
the following goals: (1) ensure ease of consistent application; (2) 
create a clear standard for lower courts; (3) recognize the Executive’s 
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legitimate foreign policy and national security objectives; (4) reduce 
the likelihood of infringing on the sovereignty of foreign 
governments; and (5) provide fair administration of certain 
constitutional guarantees to foreigners. 
Many scholars have urged that Verdugo-Urquidez’s formalistic 
approach should control analyses of constitutional extensions, while 
other scholars have promoted Boumediene’s functional approach for 
the issue.  Thus, as they have argued, either the formalistic or 
functional approach should control in its entirety.  However, these 
approaches are not mutually exclusive.  This Essay maintains that 
context matters: While citizenship and enemy status may remain 
relevant, it is a nuanced understanding of the territory prong that 
should be the most determinative factor in judicial analyses 
concerning constitutional extensions.  An approach that emphasizes 
flexibility and sovereignty, while also considering consistency and 
fairness in the application of the Constitution to foreign nationals, is 
the ideal strategy and the one promoted by this Essay. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the fixation on geographic borders and the desire to shift and 
affect jurisdiction in a globalized world, “this sort of reverse forum 
shopping by governments is much easier than it would have been in 
the past.”1 
One might assume that considerations of race, national origin, or 
citizenship are inconsequential to the application of the United States 
government’s laws and regulations. However, the geographic reach of 
the Constitution, extended on the basis of these factors, has long been 
a debated topic.2  This debate concerning the extraterritorial3 reach 
of U.S. constitutional protections upon foreign nationals have existed 
throughout U.S. history, in contexts ranging from the Second World 
War and the Cold War to international drug cartels at the southern 
U.S. border to the War on Terror.4  Foreign nationals present in the 
 
 1. See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE 
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 207 (2009). 
 2. See Eva Bitran, Note, Boumediene at the Border? The Constitution and 
Foreign Nationals on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 229, 232 
(2014) (“As the United States has expanded its footprint in the international order, 
the question of whether the Constitution should follow the flag has taken on 
increased importance.”); see also Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case 
Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 467 (2007) [hereinafter Kent, A 
Textual and Historical Case] (“Americans have long debated where, and for whose 
benefit, the Constitution applies.”); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 
YALE L.J. 909, 911 (1991) [hereinafter Neuman, Whose Constitution?] (“The domain 
of constitutionalism has always been contested, and it has grown as the nation has 
grown.”). 
 3. Extraterritorial is defined as the extension of U.S. law to regulate the conduct 
or effects, or both, that occur outside the territory of the United States. See CURTIS 
A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 167 (2d ed. 2015) 
(defining extraterritoriality as “the application of federal and state law to conduct 
that takes place at least partially outside the territory of the United States . . . ”); see 
also Zachary D. Clopton, Extraterritoriality and Extranationality: A Comparative 
Study, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 217, 218 (2013) (“[E]xtraterritoriality refers to 
the application of the laws of one country to persons, conduct, or relationships 
outside of that country.”). 
 4. See Bitran, supra note 2, at 232. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723 (2008); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 605 
United States “have been subjected to selective interrogation, 
registration, detention, and deportation on the basis of their national 
identity.”5 
The issue for the courts has been whether such constitutional 
provisions apply in cases where “some of the relevant facts are 
located outside the territorial borders of the state.”6  While the 
traditional cannons of interpretation can provide some guidance, case 
law reveals that the Supreme Court ultimately does not rely on this 
approach when deciding whether to extend the reach of the 
Constitution beyond the United States, because of the unique nature 
of constitutional questions.7  For instance, statutes can be more easily 
amended if the Supreme Court decides an issue contrary to 
congressional intent, whereas constitutional provisions are “extremely 
difficult to amend.”8 Therefore, the judiciary examines them 
differently. 
U.S. courts are still struggling to answer the broader question of 
how far constitutional protections should extend — a question with 
tremendous historical significance.  During the Civil War, for 
instance, constitutional protections did not extend to military 
enemies, leaving courts closed to enemy combatants during and after 
the war.9  This meant that all persons residing in the enemy nations 
“were out of the protection of the Constitution, no matter their 
citizenship.”10  Thus, contrary to popular belief, citizenship was not 
the determining factor; rather, determinations were made based on 
“formal, categorical distinctions between domestic and foreign 
territory, war and peace, resident and nonresident, enemy fighter and 
not, and zone of battle and elsewhere.”11  Nor did the Constitution 
 
 5. See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional 
Rights as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 367 (2003). 
 6. See Clopton, supra note 3, at 218. 
 7. See Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritoriality and the Interest of the United 
States in Regulating Its Own, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1441, 1457 (2014) [hereinafter 
Neuman, Extraterritoriality] (“Extraterritorial application of constitutional rules 
involves a set of considerations that differ in part from those relevant to 
extraterritorial application of statutory rules.”). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading 
of the Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 123 (2011) [hereinafter Kent, 
Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading] (“During wartime, both 
civilian residents of the enemy nation and enemy combatants – wherever located – 
were barred from using U.S. courts to assert legal rights.”). 
 10. See Andrew Kent, Citizenship and Protection, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2115, 
2122 (2014) [hereinafter Kent, Citizenship and Protection]. 
 11. Id. at 2123. 
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extend protections to non-U.S. nationals outside the sovereignty of 
the United States during the nineteenth century.12  Specifically, 
during the nineteenth century, the United States embraced an 
approach of strict territoriality.13  Courts treated “[t]erritorial location 
and domicile” as more determinative than citizenship when extending 
protections.14  This notion, however, was slowly abandoned and is 
now markedly different in the twenty-first century. 
Today, U.S. nationals within the United States — citizens at home 
— enjoy the full protections of the Constitution.15 Outside the United 
States, however, U.S. nationals in foreign territories — citizens 
abroad — enjoy limited constitutional protections due to certain 
exigencies or limited government power.16  More complex is the 
stance concerning foreign nationals situated domestically or abroad.  
Within the United States, foreign nationals — aliens within the 
United States — the Constitution provides certain protections, such 
as the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection.17  
Outside the United States, however, U.S. law generally does not 
protect foreign nationals in a foreign state — aliens outside the 
United States — from U.S. conduct abroad.18  Common justifications 
for this distinction are based on assertions that foreign nationals “do 
not deserve the same rights as American citizens,” “that citizenship 
makes a difference,” and the “deeply ambivalent approach of the 
Supreme Court, an ambivalence matched only by the alternately 
xenophobic and xenophilic attitude of the American public toward 
immigrants.”19 
 
 12. See Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading, supra 
note 9, at 123. 
 13. See Roszell Dulany Hunter IV, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the 
Constitution – Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649, 653 (1986). 
 14. Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2118. 
 15. See Dulany Hunter IV, supra note 13, at 660. 
 16. Id. at 661. 
 17. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (holding that 
resident aliens are entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment); see also 
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 162 (1945) (holding that resident aliens are entitled 
to the protections under the First Amendment); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 
(1915) (holding that resident aliens are entitled to the protections under the Equal 
Protection Clause); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (resident 
aliens are entitled to the protections under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that resident aliens are entitled to 
the protections under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 18. See Dulany Hunter IV, supra note 13, at 666. 
 19. Cole, supra note 5, at 367–68. 
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While it is clear that those physically present within the United 
States are protected, the protections afforded to those with little or no 
contact with U.S. territory are less clear, particularly where situations 
involve regulating U.S. government actions, or protecting foreign 
nationals outside the United States.20  It is not surprising that the 
general public presumes that non-citizens do not share the same 
rights as citizens.21  After 9/11, such concerns became even more 
pressing, since the national security of the United States was at stake, 
and detention schemes and Guantanamo took center stage in national 
discourse.22 
If foreign nationals seeking admission to the United States are 
subject to the complete and plenary power of congressional 
authority,23 the critical and complex concern is this: Whether 
foreigners can be regulated by or assert the protections of the U.S. 
Constitution when they are not on U.S. soil, but continue to be 
affected by U.S. conduct or policies abroad.24  As discussed below, 
the Supreme Court no longer strictly adheres to the doctrine of 
territoriality and instead embraces a due process, or functional, 
approach.25  Furthermore, increasing U.S. interests in “foreign 
involvements” and the development of “international protection for 
human rights” have tipped the scale in favor of providing extended 
constitutional protections to foreign nationals from U.S. conduct 
abroad.26 
This Essay traces case law on the extraterritorial applicability of 
the U.S. Constitution and criticizes the Supreme Court’s failure in the 
Hernandez decision to dispel inconsistencies and loopholes. In doing 
so, this Essay sets forth a modified approach that would accomplish 
 
 20. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 915 (describing the 
Supreme Court’s changing jurisprudence regarding U.S. government action abroad). 
 21. See Cole, supra note 5, at 369. 
 22. See Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited 
Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 867 (2010) (“What were once regarded as 
exotic issues concerning the nuances of governance in remote U.S. territories became 
urgent matters of national security in the wake of the U.S. government’s global 
detention scheme and the decision to operate long-term prisons at 
Guantanamo . . . .”). 
 23. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972) (“[P]lenary 
congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been 
firmly established.”). 
 24. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 911 (“The current debate 
primarily concerns the rights of persons harmed by United States government action 
abroad, especially aliens but also United States citizens . . . .”). 
 25. See Dulany Hunter IV, supra note 13, at 666. 
 26. Id. 
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the following goals: create a clear standard for lower courts and 
ensure consistent application; recognize the Executive’s legitimate 
foreign policy and national security objectives; reduce the likelihood 
of infringing on the sovereignty of foreign governments; and provide 
fair administration of certain constitutional guarantees to foreigners. 
The Essay proceeds in the following manner: Part I analyzes 
seminal Supreme Court cases adjudicating the scope and extent of the 
Constitution’s protections.  This Part also explores trends based on 
strict territorialism, partial territorialism, citizenship, domestic 
principles, and national security.  Part II summarizes three main 
approaches that the Supreme Court adopted in these situations and 
offers a matrix of possible situations considering particular attendant 
circumstances, such as territoriality and nationality of the claimant.  
Part III examines how Supreme Court decisions have shaped the 
position of the United States when deciding the extent of 
constitutional guarantees.  This Part also evaluates the different ways 
the Supreme Court has prioritized the prongs of territoriality, 
citizenship, and enemy status in various contexts, and tracks how the 
law has evolved with respect to the extension of constitutional rights 
abroad. Part IV recommends that the United States adopt an 
approach that reconciles the underlying approaches of Verdugo-
Urquidez’s formalism with Boumediene’s functionalism.  This 
combined scheme would recognize the distinction between foreign 
territory and controlled territory, while placing a somewhat lesser 
emphasis on citizenship and even lesser focus on enemy status.  
Finally, Part V elaborates upon the urban implications of the 
Constitution’s scope, as well as the problems faced by states when 
attempting to remedy such inconsistencies. 
I. AN ANALYSIS OF THE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
This Part examines the different shifts in extraterritoriality 
jurisprudence and analyzes the changes in the Supreme Court’s 
considerations when determining the allocation of constitutional 
protections.  As will be demonstrated in this Part, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has shifted away from a focus on territorialism — 
basing the extension of rights on the physical location of the non-
citizen in relation to the U.S. border — to an approach that 
foregrounds citizenship and national security concerns. 
Historically, the Supreme Court has used the rationale of presence 
within geographic localities — such as differences in physicality (high 
seas), social, or governmental structures — to determine whether to 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 609 
extend provisions of the Constitution to individuals from abroad.27  
Indeed, the Constitution was drafted under the attendant 
circumstance that it would apply primarily to “territorial nation-
states” within the United States.28  Therefore, the “distinction 
between being inside and outside the borders of the United States is 
not a constitutional irrelevancy.”29  The U.S. government has also 
expressed a heightened interest in regulating the conduct of those 
individuals — especially non-citizens —within and outside its 
borders.30  Since the time of Constitution’s ratification, the U.S. 
government acted to protect aliens,  not through the allocation of 
constitutional rights, but by exercising Congress’s power to enact 
legislation such as those relating to naturalization.31 
The limited geographic reach of the Constitution can be traced 
back to the nineteenth-century idea that the legal obligations of the 
United States beyond its territory  were “incomplete” — 
constitutional rights can “follow the flag,” but they “go no further.”32  
However, there are strong arguments that the text of the Constitution 
does in some form demonstrate an intent or willingness to extend its 
force beyond the territory of the United States.  For instance, the 
Constitution grants Congress the power to define and punish piracy 
and felonies “on the high Seas and Offenses against the Law of 
Nations,”33 to regulate commerce “with foreign Nations,”34 and to 
make all laws which shall be “necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.”35  Its discussion of the supremacy of 
treaties also implies some degree of constitutional power beyond the 
territory of the United States.36 
As the United States grew to be a world power, many aspects of its 
legal system expanded beyond its borders, including statutes, criminal 
enforcement procedures, regulatory laws, and of course, specific 
 
 27. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene 
v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 269 (2009) [hereinafter Neuman, The Extraterritorial 
Constitution]. 
 28. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 979. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Neuman, Extraterritoriality, supra note 7, at 1444, 1469. 
 31. See Kent, A Textual and Historical Case, supra note 2, at 524 
 32. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 977. 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 36. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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constitutional guarantees.37  This expansion initially gained traction 
after the World Wars and continued into the Cold War era.  During 
the onset of the War on Terror, the focus on regulation shifted 
internally, with a more domestic orientation.38  National security 
mechanisms presented a complicated issue for the Executive: how to 
react swiftly to threats to the United States and not be bound or 
constrained by the mandates of the Constitution. 
Beginning in the 1990s and into the early 2000s, the Executive 
sought increased discretion to hold enemy combatants, whether they 
were U.S. nationals or not.39  The Supreme Court, in response, 
tended to cut back such Executive discretion and based their 
reasoning on a combination of territory, citizenship, and enemy status 
considerations.40 
A. The Supreme Court’s Early Jurisprudence on Extraterritoriality 
To determine a claimants constitutional rights, some of the earliest 
Supreme Court cases relating to extraterritorial application of the 
U.S. Constitution focused primarily on the particular territory in 
which a claimant was located when the conduct at issue occurred and 
the claimant’s citizenship.  For instance, the Supreme Court’s 1891 In 
re Ross decision held that U.S. nationals who are abroad do not enjoy 
the same protections as U.S. nationals in the United States — a 
position based on purely formalistic reasoning relating to territory, 
rather than citizenship.41  The Court noted that “[t]he Constitution 
can have no operation in another country,” and to hold otherwise 
would simply “be impracticable from the impossibility of obtaining a 
competent grand or petit jury.”42  Here, the Supreme Court’s 
completely formalistic approach restricted constitutional protections 
to the territory of the United States. 
Twenty years after In re Ross was decided, the Supreme Court 
addressed a series of cases between 1901 and 1922 — known as the 
 
 37. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 189. 
 38. Id. at 188–90. 
 39. See infra Section I.D. (discussing the legislative efforts to strip courts of 
jurisdiction to hear certain cases, producing Executive discretion with little 
constitutional bounds in Guantanamo). 
 40. Id. (referring to invalidating the attempts by the Legislature and Executive to 
strip judicial authority to adjudicate these cases and avoid the mandates of the 
Constitution). 
 41. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (asserting that the Constitution was 
established for the United States, and not for countries beyond its territorial reach). 
 42. Id. at 464. 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 611 
Insular Cases — regarding territories acquired by the United States 
during the Spanish-American War.43  These decisions created 
distinctions regarding the treatment of incorporated and 
unincorporated territories.44  The territories at issue were Puerto 
Rico, Guam, Hawaii, American Samoa, and the Philippines.45 
One of the particularly significant Insular Cases, Downes v. 
Bidwell, involved the question of whether Congress could tax imports 
from Puerto Rico, an unincorporated territory, and whether the 
Uniformity Clause of the Constitution applied to Puerto Rico.46  The 
Court held that Congress was able to tax the imports, subject only to 
the fundamental limitations of the Constitution, which “exist rather 
by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution from which 
Congress derives all its powers, [rather] than by any express and 
direct application of its provision.”47  The Court held so even though 
it had previously ruled that Puerto Rico was considered a state and 
the Constitution prohibited taxing imports from any state.48 
Ultimately, the Court explained that territories like Puerto Rico were 
not considered part of the United States.49 
Justice White’s concurrence articulated the distinction between 
congressional authority when dealing with incorporated territories — 
or those that are designed for statehood  — and unincorporated 
territories — where only those rights deemed fundamental would be 
applicable.50  Thus, the takeaway from the Insular Cases in general 
appears to be that the Constitution applies in territories that will 
become a part of the Union, but will only apply in other territories if 
the Court determines those constitutional provisions are 
“fundamental.”51 The distinction made by Justice White’s 
 
 43. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901). See also Goetze v. United States, 
182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. 
United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. 
N.Y. & Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901). 
 44. See Netta Rotstein, Note, Boumediene vs. Verdugo-Urquidez: The Battle for 
Control over Extraterritoriality at the Southwestern Border, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1371, 1376 (2016). 
 45. Id. at 1375–76. 
 46. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 247–49. 
 47. Id. at 268, 287. 
 48. Id. at 256, 287. 
 49. See id. at 250–51. 
 50. Id. at 311–12. 
 51. See Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and 
Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 800 (2005). 
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concurrence informs the doctrine of territorial incorporation.52  Over 
one hundred years later, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed Justice White’s Downes concurrence and declared that the 
Constitution applied completely to incorporated territories, but only 
in part for unincorporated territories.53 
The Insular Cases and Boumediene’s holdings, however, are not 
without disapproval.  Harvard Law Professor Gerald Neuman 
criticized the Insular Cases as an exercise of illegitimate government 
power that resulted from acquiring power over new territories 
without the consent of the population and without affording them the 
rights guaranteed under the Constitution.54  These cases, and In re 
Ross, stood for the proposition that “American citizens cannot be 
tried by the federal government for capital offenses without jury trial 
in Japan, but can be so tried in Puerto Rico.”55 
These holdings meant that the United States could retain 
sovereignty over these island territories, but would only be bound by 
the constitutional provisions that the Court determined to be 
“fundamental.”56  This was less of a territorial distinction than In re 
Ross had exhibited, though the Insular Cases still did not generally 
distinguish between U.S. nationals and foreign nationals.57 
B. World War II and Changes in Extraterritorial Jurisprudence 
The United States’s emergence as a world leader gave it both the 
confidence and power to regulate extraterritorially.  In Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, for example, the Supreme Court refused to grant habeas 
relief to enemy combatants held in a German prison by the U.S. 
Army in the American sector of occupied Germany, because alien 
combatants have no right to constitutional protections.58  Justice 
Jackson described the protections afforded to foreign nationals within 
 
 52. See Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality 
After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 988 (2009) [hereinafter Burnett, A 
Convenient Constitution?]. 
 53. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008). 
 54. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 978. 
 55. Id. at 979. 
 56. Id. at 915. 
 57. See Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2127–28. 
 58. See generally Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).  The petitioners 
argued that their imprisonment violated Articles I and III of the Constitution and the 
Fifth Amendment.  See id. at 767; see also id. at 776 (“[T]he nonresident enemy alien, 
especially one who has remained in the service of the enemy, does not have even this 
qualified access to our courts, for he neither has comparable claims upon our 
institutions nor could his use of them fail to be helpful to the enemy.”). 
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U.S. history as having been on a “generous and ascending scale of 
rights” that increase as the foreign national increases his or her ties to 
the United States.59  A foreign national’s presence within the United 
States gives the courts the authority to extend constitutional 
protections.60  In other words, habeas relief could not be granted 
here, because the prisoners were not within a territory over which the 
United States exercised sovereignty and the circumstances at issue 
“were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United 
States.”61  Thus, Eisentrager demonstrates the strength of the 
connection between the individual and the state and asserts the 
dominance of a territorial nexus over one based on citizenship.62 
The Court faced a contradiction between Eisentrager’s holding and 
an earlier case involving enemy combatants, Ex parte Quirin.63  Ex 
parte Quirin, decided in 1942, involved the constitutionality of a 
German saboteurs’ trial in the United States.64  Similarly, Eisentrager 
involved German nationals held as enemy combatants; thus, a 
distinction between enemy and non-enemy combatant could not be 
maintained after Ex parte Quirin’s assertion of jurisdiction over 
enemy combatants.65  Therefore, even though the territorial 
distinction — the physical presence in the United States — was 
critical, Eisentrager also made clear that certain constitutional 
protections will not extend abroad whether one is an enemy alien or 
non-enemy alien.  Rather, constitutional protections are applicable 
abroad only to U.S. citizens.  Justice Jackson pronounced this 
territorial distinction to justify the Court’s refusal to extend 
jurisdiction to foreign nationals.66 
Justice Jackson’s formalistic holding in Eisentrager is considered a 
pretext by some scholars who maintain that “the Court’s objection to 
hearing the habeas petitions at issue did not turn on the fact that 
Landsberg lies outside the ‘sovereignty’ of the United States,” but 
was instead based on the concern that “the petitions were being filed 
 
 59. Id. at 770 (noting that the foreign national’s identity with U.S. society 
increases first by “[m]ere lawful presence in the country,” then by the “preliminary 
declaration of intention to become a citizen,” and finally expand in full “to those of 
full citizenship upon naturalization”). 
 60. Id. at 771. 
 61. Id. at 778 (quoting, “the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and 
their punishment”). 
 62. Id. at 769. 
 63. Id. at 779–80; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 64. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20–21, 48. 
 65. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779–80; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48. 
 66. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 780–81. 
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by enemy aliens, during a time of war, in a place outside United 
States territory or its ‘territorial jurisdiction.’”67  Other scholars have 
cautioned that states may use Eisentrager’s territorial limitation of 
habeas “to intentionally place detainees beyond the reach of 
courts.”68  Justice Black’s dissent foreshadowed a similar concern 
when he asserted that denying habeas solely because the petitioners 
were convicted and imprisoned abroad created a “broad and 
dangerous principle,” which would deny courts the power to afford 
constitutional protections to aliens abroad.69  In other words, under 
formalistic reasoning, the need to consider context is obviated: the 
United States could easily have placed suspects in territories without 
access to the judiciary, in an effort to advance its own interests, cover 
up potential abuses, and evade criticism. 
Reid v. Covert marks an important turning point: the Court held 
that the Constitution applies in its entirety to U.S. nationals living 
abroad in a foreign state.70  In Justice Black’s plurality opinion, the 
Court “reject[ed] the idea that, when the United States acts against 
citizens abroad, it can do so free of the Bill of Rights.”71  When the 
United States seeks to regulate the conduct of its nationals abroad, 
the Bill of Rights operates as the “shield” that protects the U.S. 
national’s “life and liberty.”72  This protection is not stripped away 
even when that U.S. national is in another land.73  Thus, these 
protections do operate to restrict the conduct of the U.S. government; 
after all, as the Court stated, “[t]he United States is entirely a 
creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other 
source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed 
by the Constitution.”74 
Reid’s significance lies in its abandonment of the strict, formalistic 
approach adhered to by the judiciary in prior cases. The Constitution 
applies wherever the U.S. government acts: it serves as the source of 
 
 67. See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intra-Territorial Constitution, 2 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 369, 387 (2007). 
 68. See BRIAN R. FARRELL, HABEAS CORPUS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 150 (2017). 
 69. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 795. 
 70. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1957).  Here, civilian wives of military 
men were denied the constitutional right to a jury trial and were instead tried in a 
U.S. military court for the murders of their husbands while overseas. The women 
sought a writ of habeas, claiming they were entitled to a trial before a civilian jury. Id. 
at 3–5. 
 71. Id. at 5. 
 72. Id. at 6. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 5–6. 
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the government’s authority to act.75  While this appears to represent 
the end of the “regime of strict territoriality,”76 as set forth below, this 
is not always true, especially when foreign nationals are involved. 
C.  Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment Application in 
Extraterritorial Jurisprudence 
The extraterritorial application of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments has been interpreted more formalistically by courts, 
complicating the issue of the Constitution’s extended reach and 
resulting in confusion regarding guidance for the lower courts.  In 
Verdugo-Urquidez and Hernandez, the Court’s approach seems 
counter to the jurisprudence of the Detainee Cases.77 
In Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican national was prosecuted for his 
role in a Mexican narcotics-trafficking organization that smuggled 
narcotics into the United States and for allegedly participating in the 
murder of a DEA agent.78  The Mexican police seized Verdugo-
Urquidez and extradited him to the United States.79  The next day, 
DEA agents conducted a warrantless search of his home in Mexico 
while he was in U.S. custody and found records relating to his 
smuggling business.80  Verdugo-Urquidez moved to suppress the 
evidence seized during the search, claiming the search by U.S. agents 
violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless 
searches and seizures.81  The district court granted the motion to 
suppress, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the warrantless 
search violated the Fourth Amendment.82 
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. Protections against 
arbitrary searches and seizures only apply to “the people” of the 
United States and were not “intended to restrain the actions of the 
Federal Government against aliens outside of the United States 
territory.”83  The term “the people,” unlike the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, applied only to the “class of persons who are part of a 
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
 
 75. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 915. 
 76. Id. at 965. 
 77. See infra Section I.D. (discussing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)). 
 78. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262–63 (1990). 
 79. Id. at 262. 
 80. Id. at 262–63. 
 81. See id. at 263. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 265–66. 
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connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community.”84  Because Verdugo-Urquidez did not meet any of these 
prerequisites, the Fourth Amendment constitutional protection did 
not extend to him.85 
The Chief Justice grounded his conclusions in a “slippery slope” 
argument: that extending the Fourth Amendment abroad in these 
circumstances would have “significant and deleterious consequences 
for the United States in conducting activities beyond its 
boundaries.”86  For instance, a holding in favor of Verdugo-Urquidez 
could have affected the government’s ability to “respond to foreign 
situations involving our national interest” and could have allowed 
aliens with no connection to the United States to assert Fourth 
Amendment violations in U.S. courts based on conduct in “foreign 
countries or in international waters.”87  The case seems to suggest 
that foreign nationals cannot assert any constitutional protections 
unless they demonstrated a connection to the territory of the United 
States, which likely referred to residency or at least something more 
than mere temporary custody in the United States.88  Thus, this 
opinion reflected a strict and formalistic approach to constitutional 
extensions that draw a clear line between the guarantees afforded to 
U.S. nationals and foreign nationals.89  Nevertheless, a more 
functional approach was on the horizon, since “pure territoriality was 
no longer an option.”90 
 
 84. Id. at 265 (citing United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 
(1904)). 
 85. Id. at 274–75 (“At the time of the search, he was a citizen and resident of 
Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States, and the place searched 
was located in Mexico. Under these circumstances, the Fourth Amendment has no 
application.”). 
 86. See id. at 273. 
 87. Id. at 273–74 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). 
 88. See id. at 272 (“When the search of his house in Mexico took place, he had 
been present in the United States for only a matter of days. We do not think the 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the search of premises in Mexico should 
turn on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the custodian of its nonresident alien 
owner had or had not transported him to the United States at the time the search was 
made.”). The Court noted that in the future, restrictions on such searches and 
seizures could exist, but “they must be imposed by the political branches through 
diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation.” Id. at 275. 
 89. See Bitran, supra note 2, at 236 (“Reid and Verdugo-Urquidez drew a clear 
fault line between citizens, whose participation in the polity entitled them to a degree 
of constitutional protection abroad, and noncitizens, who were not granted such 
protection.”). 
 90. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and 
Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2038 (2005). 
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In 2017, the Supreme Court considered the extraterritorial 
applicability of Fourth and Sixth Amendment protections.  In 2010, 
Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca was fatally shot and killed by a 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agent on U.S. territory, while 
Hernandez was on Mexican soil.91  The Fifth Circuit held that foreign 
nationals may invoke the constitutional protections of the Fifth 
Amendment for an injury caused by a U.S. agent that occurred 
outside the de jure sovereignty of the United States.92  However, the 
Fifth Circuit declined to extend the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment to foreign nationals in Mexico, as the foreign national 
here did not have any significant voluntary connection to the territory 
of the United States.93 
The Supreme Court sidestepped the Fourth Amendment issue, 
noting that the question is “sensitive and may have consequences that 
are far reaching.”94  Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim, the 
Court noted that qualified immunity is limited by what the officer 
knew at the time of the conduct and that facts learned after the 
incident is over “are not relevant.”95  Justice Breyer dissented, noting 
that the Court’s decision runs afoul of Boumediene’s functional 
approach dealing with issues of extraterritorial extensions of the 
Constitution.96 
Hernandez was criticized for failing to affirmatively decide whether 
the claimant had a Fourth or Fifth Amendment right or whether 
Mesa violated those rights.97  Most importantly, the holding of 
Hernandez ignored one crucial factor underscored in Boumediene: 
“the examination of the nature of the site where the constitutional 
violation took place, with the emphasis on US control of the territory 
in question.”98 
 
 91. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2004–05 (2017). 
 92. Id. at 2005 (“The panel held that Hernández lacked any Fourth Amendment 
rights under the circumstances, but that the shooting violated his Fifth Amendment 
rights.”); see also Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 272 (2014). But see 
Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 2015) (wherein the Fifth 
Circuit conducted a rehearing en banc, and while the court was divided as to whether 
Mesa’s actions constituted a violation of the Fifth Amendment, the panel 
unanimously concluded that any Fifth Amendment right Hernandez may have had 
was not clearly established at the time of the incident). 
 93. See Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 266. 
 94. Id. at 2007. 
 95. Id. (citing White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017)). 
 96. Id. at 2008–09. 
 97. See Rotstein, supra note 44, at 1391 n.138. 
 98. Id. at 1392. See infra Section I.D. 
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Scholars have pointed out that Hernandez was improperly 
analogized to Verdugo-Urquidez in that the concerns over the 
warrant requirement are “inapplicable to excessive deadly force 
claims against U.S. government agents,” since there is “no concern for 
potential conflict of laws or conflicts with foreign sovereigns” in the 
latter situation regardless of whether the foreign national is 
technically within U.S. territory or on the Mexico side of the border.99  
Instead of considering where the constitutional violation took place as 
mandated by Boumediene, the Court analyzed only the citizenship 
and status of the petitioner, which inevitably led to a formalistic 
analysis based mostly on citizenship.100  Consequently, lower courts 
have no guidance on how to apply the Constitution abroad to settle 
such disputes.101 
D. The Detainee Cases and Extraterritoriality 
Following the War on Terror, a new series of cases regarding the 
applicability of constitutional protections to enemy combatants made 
their way to the Supreme Court, resulting in several opinions that 
tested executive authority to designate individuals as enemy 
combatants and hold them without counsel or judicial review.102  
These cases have been notorious for their rejection not only of 
absolute territorialism, but also of the Executive’s claim of power to 
detain these suspects without certain Constitutional restraints.103  The 
conflict between individual liberties and the authority of the 
Executive was prevalent during this era.104  The result was simply the 
decision that the Executive is not exempt from judicial scrutiny.105 
 
 99. See Rotstein, supra note 44, at 1396. 
 100. Id. at 1399–1400. 
 101. See Alexandra A. Botsaris, Note, Hernandez v. Mesa: Preserving the Zone of 
Constitutional Uncertainty at the Border, 77 MD. L. REV. 832, 832 (2018). 
 102. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466 (2004). See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 103. Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) after 
9/11, which authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force” 
against those determined to have “planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks” of 9/11 or those who “harbored such organizations or persons” in 
order to prevent future acts of terrorism against the United States. See Authorization 
for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107‐40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).  It was the 
position of the Bush Administration that the AUMF provided the military with the 
authorization to hold and detain military combatants.  See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509–
11, 517. 
 104. See Roosevelt III, supra note 90, at 2017. 
 105. Id. at 2018. 
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In Rasul, the Supreme Court held that the federal habeas statute106 
extended to detainees at Guantanamo Bay.107  The foreign national 
detainees filed habeas corpus petitions, claiming that they were 
detained in Guantanamo without being charged with a crime and 
without access to counsel.108  Here, the Court refused to delineate a 
distinction between foreign nationals and U.S. nationals for purposes 
of the habeas statute’s coverage.109  The statute’s grant of jurisdiction 
to federal courts, coupled with U.S. control over Guantanamo, led the 
Court to conclude that the detainees at Guantanamo had the right to 
habeas under the statute.110  The Court distinguished the present case 
from Eisentrager, finding that the Rasul petitioners “[were] not 
nationals of countries at war with the United States”; they 
“den[ied] . . . acts of aggression against the United States,” “[had] 
never been afforded access to any tribunal,” and for over two years 
“[were] imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises 
exclusive jurisdiction and control.”111  Because of this, the foreign 
nationals at Guantanamo were “no less than American citizens,” and, 
as such, were “entitled to invoke the federal courts’ authority under § 
2241.”112 
The Supreme Court also decided Hamdi v. Rumsfeld the same 
year.  Hamdi was a U.S. national who the U.S. government alleged 
was an enemy combatant.113  Importantly, the Court acknowledged 
that “the threats to military operations posed by a basic system of 
 
 106. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2018). The Habeas Corpus Statute grants federal courts 
jurisdiction over habeas petitions to “any person” as opposed to “any citizen” who is 
“held in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the U.S. or 
United States.”  Id. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3); see Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471. Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority, noted that the Lease Agreement from 1903 states that the 
United States recognizes Cuba as the ultimate sovereign over Guantanamo, with the 
United States able to exercise complete jurisdiction over the area. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 
480. 
 107. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484. 
 108. Id. at 471–72. 
 109. Id. at 474–75 (“Consistent with the historic purpose of the writ, this Court has 
recognized the federal courts’ power to review applications for habeas relief in a wide 
variety of cases involving executive detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace. 
The Court has, for example, entertained the habeas petitions of an American citizen 
who plotted an attack on military installations during the Civil War . . . and of 
admitted enemy aliens convicted of war crimes during a declared war and held in the 
United States . . . .”). 
 110. Id. at 484 (“We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District Court 
jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their 
detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.”). 
 111. Id. at 476. 
 112. Id. at 481. 
 113. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). 
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independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core 
rights to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to be 
heard by an impartial adjudicator.”114  It is the responsibility of the 
judiciary, absent suspension of the writ by Congress, to review the 
legality of executive detentions whether in times of military conflict 
or not.115  Therefore, detainees who are U.S. citizens are “entitled at a 
minimum to notice of the Government’s claimed factual basis for 
holding him, and to a fair chance to rebut it before a neutral 
decisionmaker.”116 
Some scholars have noted that there was no need to distinguish 
between places where the United States has control and places where 
the United States has sovereignty, since the Court has clearly stated 
that “Guantanamo is functionally U.S. territory that our government 
controls and, as such, the federal courts are authorized to grant relief 
under the habeas statute.”117  These holdings direct courts to treat 
Guantanamo as a United States territory for purposes of habeas 
relief.118  However, territoriality is not a helpful standard since the 
consideration of the Constitution’s applicability “will produce 
different answers depending on whether we define territory by 
technical notions of sovereignty or by practical considerations of 
jurisdiction and control.”119  Nevertheless, other scholars contend that 
these opinions have not clearly addressed why detainees have 
constitutional rights in Guantanamo.120  Is it merely based on the fact 
that the detainees are human beings, or because of the unique 
character of the authority of the United States over Guantanamo?121 
As a direct response to Rasul, Congress passed the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), a jurisdiction-stripping statute 
designed to prevent federal courts from adjudicating petitions for 
writs of habeas corpus from detainees at Guantanamo Bay.122  
 
 114. Id. at 535. 
 115. See id. at 535, 537. 
 116. Id. at 533. 
 117. See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 67, at 405. 
 118. See Roosevelt III, supra note 90, at 2059. 
 119. Id. at 2060 (noting that this approach “might also depend on how we construe 
the location of the acts complained of”). 
 120. See Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional 
Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2074 (2005) [hereinafter 
Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology]. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001–06, 119 Stat 2680 (2005). 
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld clarified the legality of this statute in 2006.123  
Here, Hamdan, a Yemeni national, filed a petition for habeas, 
claiming first that the military commission convened by the President 
lacks authority under congressional acts and the common law of war, 
and second, that the procedures used to try him violate martial and 
international law.124  The Supreme Court grappled with the issue of 
whether the military commission had the authority to try Hamdan 
and whether the Geneva Convention could be relied on in such 
proceedings.125  The Supreme Court held that the DTA did not apply 
to cases that had already been pending at the time Congress passed 
the statute.126  The procedures of the military commission violated 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and Common Article 3 
of the Third Geneva Conventions.127  Justice Stevens noted that the 
President does not have the authority to promulgate an executive 
order creating military commission procedures that depart from the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.128  Justices Kennedy and Breyer, in 
concurring opinions, noted that the President could always get the 
necessary approval from Congress.129 
In response to the Hamdan decision, Congress enacted the Military 
Commission Act (MCA) in 2006.130  Section 7 of the MCA amended 
the federal habeas statute to strip the jurisdiction from federal courts 
over pending and future habeas petitions to entertain petitions for 
writs of habeas on behalf of an individual detained by the United 
States “who has been determined by the United States to have been 
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such 
determination.”131 
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Boumediene v. Bush, where 
the Court was tasked with determining whether the jurisdiction-
stripping provision of Section 7 of the MCA was constitutional and, 
 
 123. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593–94 (2006) (“Neither [the AUMF 
or the DTA], however, expands the President’s authority to convene military 
commissions.”). 
 124. Id. at 567. 
 125. Id. at 571. 
 126. Id. at 575–76. 
 127. Id. at 613, 635. 
 128. Id. at 613, 623 (“The UCMJ conditions the President’s use of military 
commissions on compliance not only with the American common law of war, but also 
with the rest of the UCMJ itself . . . . The procedures that the Government has 
decreed will govern Hamdan’s trial by commission violate these laws.”). 
 129. Id. at 636. 
 130. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2008). 
 131. See id. § 2241(e). 
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ultimately, whether the Suspension Clause extended habeas to 
detainees at Guantanamo.132  Boumediene ultimately confirmed that 
foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo as unlawful alien 
combatants have the constitutional right to challenge the lawfulness 
of their detentions via habeas corpus petition before U.S. district 
courts.133 While the majority accepted the fact that the United States 
did not have de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo, it noted that this 
has not always been the “touchstone of habeas corpus jurisdiction.”134  
In other words, even though Cuba had ultimate sovereignty over 
Guantanamo, the United States was still found to exercise “complete 
jurisdiction and control.”135 
The Boumediene Court identified three factors to consider when 
determining the propriety of extending constitutional rights to foreign 
nationals: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the 
adequacy of the process through which that status determination was 
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then 
detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in 
resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”136  This test has been 
promoted as a functional, pragmatic, multi-factor balancing test and 
regarded as a rejection of the prior formalistic, absolute approach to 
determining the geographic scope of constitutional rights.137  
Considering these factors, the Court concluded that “Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, 
of the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.”138 
Justice Kennedy based his conclusions on the control that the 
United States did exercise over Guantanamo Bay.139  The petitioners 
were not U.S. nationals, but rather enemy combatants whose 
detentions occurred outside the sovereignty of the United States; 
however, U.S. control over Guantanamo was different than the 
situation presented in Eisentrager.140  Thus, the Supreme Court 
 
 132. Id. at 732 (“Petitioners present a question not resolved by our earlier cases 
relating to the detention of aliens at Guantanamo: whether they have the 
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, a privilege not to be withdrawn except in 
conformance with the Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.”). 
 133. Id. at 793, 795. 
 134. Id. at 755. 
 135. Id. at 753. 
 136. Id. at 766. 
 137. Id. at 764 (“[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and 
practical concerns, not formalism.”). 
 138. Id. at 771 (concluding that the detainees were “entitled to the privilege of 
habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention”). 
 139. Id. at 755. 
 140. Id. at 766–67. 
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concluded that an extension of the Suspension Clause would not be 
“impracticable and anomalous” under these circumstances.141  
Furthermore, the precedents from the Insular Cases and Reid v. 
Covert were found to “undermine the Government’s argument that, 
at least as applied to noncitizens, the Constitution necessarily stops 
where de jure sovereignty ends.”142 
Boumediene was celebrated because it allowed detainees to resort 
to the courts to determine the lawfulness of their detention, and the 
government was no longer exempt from judicial scrutiny.143  Habeas 
has traditionally been, and remains, the “sword and shield in the long 
struggle for freedom and constitutional government,” which acts as “a 
potent weapon against tyranny in every form and guise.”144  
Boumediene was also significant in that the functional approach — 
the “impracticable and anomalous” standard — that had been urged 
in prior concurrences had finally found expression in Justice 
Kennedy’s majority.145  However, the opinion appears to be based 
less on citizenship as it would initially seem, and instead more on an 
expanded definition of territory.146  It should be noted that the result 
may differ if the detainee is outside both the United States and 
Guantanamo.  This implies that Boumediene did not set forth a clear 
mandate to utilizing the functional approach, since it “did not 
explicitly overrule the formalist approach,” and may also — whether 
 
 141. Id. at 770. 
 142. Id. at 755. 
 143. See FARRELL, supra note 68, at 10 (tracing the history of how the “writ of 
habeas corpus was transformed by judges from a tool to exert state authority to one 
that would be used to regulate government power”). 
 144. See United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Regan, 86 F. Supp. 382, 388 (N.D. Ill. 
1949). 
 145. See Botsaris, supra note 101, at 843 (“Evidently, this decision declined to 
follow the formalist precedent and relied primarily on functionalist thinking.”); see 
also Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution, supra note 27, at 282 (“With regard 
to citizens, in one sense the Boumediene opinion merely repeats what both Kennedy 
and Rehnquist seemed to be saying in Verdugo-Urquidez. Rehnquist explicitly 
described the selective (functional) approach articulated in the concurrences by 
Harlan and Frankfurter in Reid v. Covert — rather than Black’s plurality opinion — 
as controlling the overseas application of the Bill of Rights to citizens.”); Rotstein, 
supra note 44, at 1392 (“First, the sufficient connections test proposed by Verdugo-
Uriquidez, which the Hernandez court relied exclusively upon, is not good law as 
Boumediene essentially overruled it.”). 
 146. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754 (“Indeed, it is not altogether uncommon for 
a territory to be under the de jure sovereignty of one nation, while under the plenary 
control, or practical sovereignty, of another. This condition can occur when the 
territory is seized during war, as Guantanamo was during the Spanish-American 
War.”). 
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inadvertently or not — have left the door open for other formalistic 
approaches.147 
Several inconsistencies remain even after Boumediene.  For 
instance, the opinion does not directly answer the question of “what 
entitles someone to constitutional protection.”148  Boumediene did, 
however, effectively repudiate Verdugo-Urquidez’s holding that 
noncitizens with no connection to the United States have no 
constitutional protections.149  But in doing so, Boumediene inevitably 
“opened the door for a wider range of noncitizens to claim 
rights . . . .”150  It also left unclear the applicability of this functional 
approach to situations involving locations other than Guantanamo, 
where the United States holds and detains foreign national terrorism 
suspects.151   Professor Anthony Colangelo has noted that, if the 
Court continues to use de facto sovereignty — which he describes as 
“both complete control and complete jurisdiction such that U.S. law 
and the U.S. legal system govern the territory” —  then those in other 
sites holding detainees will likely not be extended the same habeas 
protections afforded to those at Guantanamo.152  In moving forward 
after Boumediene, some scholars have offered theories that promote 
the starting of judicial analyses with “examining the nature of the 
control of the United States over the foreign territory in question”153 
or “first address[ing] the scope of government power on its own terms 
before discussing applicable rights.”154 
 
 147. See Botsaris, supra note 101, at 843 (noting that “the Court left open two 
routes to the extraterritorial analysis based on opposing theories of legal 
interpretation”). 
 148. See Bitran, supra note 2, at 240; see also Neuman, Extraterritoriality, supra 
note 7, at 1460 (“Still, for the sake of other rights it would have been helpful if the 
majority had hinted at the circumstances that can provide a starting point for 
applying the functional approach to the rights of noncitizens.”). 
 149. Bitran, supra note 2, at 248. 
 150. Id. at 248–49 (“If the Court was willing to grant constitutional protections to 
alleged enemies of the state, surely it would consider extending rights to noncitizens 
outside U.S. custody who are far from a battlefield and unlikely enemies.”). 
 151. See Zachary M. Vaughan, Note, The Reach of the Writ: Boumediene v. Bush 
and the Political Question Doctrine, 99 GEO. L.J. 869, 870 (2011); see also Neuman, 
The Extraterritorial Constitution, supra note 27, at 278. 
 152. See Anthony J. Colangelo, “De facto Sovereignty”: Boumediene and Beyond, 
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 663, 667–68 (2009) (“Thus, if the Court continues to use 
the jurisdictional aspect of de facto sovereignty to inform the constitutional scope of 
habeas, as it did in Boumediene, noncitizen government-designated enemy 
combatants detained in Afghanistan and Iraq likely will not constitutionally have 
access to the writ.”). 
 153. See Rotstein, supra note 44, at 1398. 
 154. See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 22, at 884. 
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E. The Territory-Citizenship-Enemy Model 
The Territory-Citizenship-Enemy Model proposes a means of 
organizing and analyzing the Court’s rationale at various 
jurisprudential junctures, when the Court was tasked with deciding 
whether, and how, to extend constitutional protections in different 
situations. It traces the evolution of the Court’s priorities as between 
territory, citizenship, and enemy status considerations. This Model 
characterizes the holdings of only the Supreme Court and does not 
account for the analyses of the lower courts in each case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
As suggested by the Model, In re Ross turned more on territory 
rather than citizenship.155  Later, in the Insular Cases, territorial 
considerations continued to take center stage in the Court’s analysis.  
This trend continued in Eisentrager — a case in which the Court’s 
prioritization of territory considerations, over citizenship and enemy 
status, was perhaps the most evident. 
Reid, however, departed from this trend, with the opinion focusing 
on citizenship as the determinative factor.  Reid started a movement 
based on the notion that courts “reject the idea that when the United 
States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of 
Rights.”156  In Justice Harlan’s concurrence, U.S. jurisprudence first 
 
 155. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). 
 156. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). 
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hears the words “impracticable and anomalous”157 as a standard for 
determining when and to what extent the Constitution should be 
applied extraterritorially in certain circumstances.  Reid marked the 
end of the formalistic approach and the beginning of an era of the 
functional approach. 
Interestingly, in the Verdugo-Urquidez opinion, the Court seemed 
to revert to a more formalistic approach in its holding: the Fourth 
Amendment only protects “the people” of the United States and is 
not intended to apply its protections to “aliens outside of the United 
States territory.”158  However, the case is somewhat inconsistent with 
precedent, as it failed to appreciate the significance of the “generous 
and ascending scale of rights” from Eisentrager regarding the 
connections of a foreign national to the United States.159 
Again, the Court pivoted meaningfully in the early 2000s, when 
faced with a series of cases regarding the War on Terror.  These cases 
seem to reject territorialism or at least the general understanding of 
what a United States territory is.  Rasul and Hamdi both 
demonstrated the willingness of the Supreme Court to extend rights 
to foreign nationals outside the United States.160  Hamdan may be 
considered somewhat of an anomaly that does not clearly advance the 
analysis proposed by this Model, as the decision turned mainly on 
separation of powers principles.161  Boumediene, which tested the 
Executive’s ability to gain more power in detaining suspects at 
Guantanamo, reflected the Court’s attempt at balancing 
considerations of territory, citizenship, and enemy status in its 
analysis.  However, the territory prong retained its expanded 
definition, since in Boumediene, territory was based on U.S. control 
over Guantanamo.162 Finally, in 2017, Hernandez saw a return to the 
formalistic approach, with a greater emphasis on the citizenship prong 
than on territory.163 
 
 157. Id. at 74. 
 158. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990). 
 159. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950). 
 160. See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507 (2004). 
 161. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 162. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 754–55 (2008). 
 163. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2008 (2017). 
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II. APPROACHES TO EXTRATERRITORIAL EXTENSIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 
Part II discusses the three approaches the Supreme Court has 
considered when adjudicating the scope and extent of the 
Constitution’s application.  These three approaches are best 
demonstrated in the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions of 
Verdugo-Urquidez.164  Cases similar to Verdugo-Urquidez have 
turned largely on context — namely, on the Court’s approach at a 
given historical moment and the specific facts of each case.165  This 
Part also analyzes a matrix of possible solutions, dependent upon the 
territory or citizenship prongs, to illuminate the subtle differences in 
case outcomes. 
A. The Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions of Verdugo-
Urquidez 
The first approach was demonstrated in Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority — or more appropriately, the plurality — opinion.166  Under 
this first approach, U.S citizens have some (but not absolute) 
extraterritorial constitutional rights, while foreign nationals do not.167  
This approach recognizes the importance of extending the 
Constitution’s protections to its own nationals but stops short of 
providing those same guarantees to foreign nationals. 
The second approach derives from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
in Verdugo-Urquidez.168  Under the second approach, “[f]or both 
citizens and aliens, a contextual, due-process-style analysis” is utilized 
to determine which constitutional guarantees would apply and 
whether adherence to that constitutional guarantee would be 
“impracticable and anomalous.”169 
 
 164. See supra Section I.C. See generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 
U.S. 259 (1990). 
 165. For a discussion of other cases where the holding was dependent upon the 
time it was decided, see supra Part I. 
 166. Id. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology, supra 
note 120, at 2075. 
 167. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology, supra note 
120, at 2075–76 (“U.S. citizens have extraterritorial constitutional rights and foreign 
nationals do not. Even as to citizens, the Bill of Rights does not apply fully and 
literally overseas.”). 
 168. Id. at 2076. 
 169. Id. 
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The third approach appears in Justice Brennan’s dissent in 
Verdugo-Urquidez,170 where he argues that it is counterintuitive for 
the United States to be able to enforce laws abroad but not be bound 
by the mandates of the Constitution.  Professor Neuman notes that 
this approach “presumes that the extension of U.S. constitutional 
rights accompanies the assertion of an obligation to obey U.S. law.”171  
While the Constitution should apply to all persons — including non-
U.S. nationals — within the United States and territories and all U.S. 
citizens extraterritorially, it should only apply extraterritorially to 
foreign nations when the United States “seeks to impose and enforce 
its own law.”172  Ultimately, however, it must be noted that the 
application of a constitutional right could produce different results in 
domestic and foreign locations.173 
B.  Matrix of Possible Situations and Corresponding Outcomes 
Extraterritorial extensions of federal statutes primarily analyze the 
location of the conduct that was subject to regulation.174  In contrast, 
when dealing with the extraterritorial extensions of certain provisions 
of the Constitution, a claimant’s citizenship status has also been a 
consideration, in addition to territoriality.175  Therefore, depending 
on the claimant’s nationality and the location of the conduct, the 
results will differ substantially.  The four situations are displayed 
below along with the most notable cases that have characterized each 
situation.176 
 
 
(1)  
U.S. National 
U.S. Conduct  
 
Incorporation Cases; Insular Cases 
 
(2) 
Non-U.S. National 
U.S. Conduct 
 
Insular Cases 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 2077. 
 172. Id. (“[C]onstitutional rights should presumptively apply to all persons within 
U.S. territory, and to all U.S. citizens in any location, but that extraterritorial rights of 
foreign nationals presumptively arise only in contexts where the United States seeks 
to impose and enforce its own law.”). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See CLYDE SPILLENGER, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 409 (2010). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. This chart has been adapted from Spillenger’s book. 
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(3) 
U.S. National 
Non-U.S. Conduct  
 
Reid v. Covert 
 
(4) 
Non-U.S. National 
Non-U.S. Conduct 
 
Verdugo-Urquidez 
 
As demonstrated above, because Situations (1) and (2) involve 
U.S. conduct within the territory of the United States, the Bill of 
Rights is fully applicable to both U.S. and foreign nationals.177  This 
makes citizenship irrelevant where the conduct is in the United States 
and has been reflected in judicial and legislative precedent.178  
Situation (3) involves conduct not in the United States, but as 
pertaining to a U.S. national.  While the right to a trial by jury and 
indictment by grand jury extended to the claimants in Reid, the Court 
held that constitutional extensions do not apply in every circumstance 
when a U.S. national is abroad.179  Situation (4), denoting non-U.S. 
nationals and non-U.S. conduct, is the arguably most problematic, 
because it involves the least connections to the United States.  Such 
incidents usually arise with the United States-Mexico border.180  
Verdugo-Urquidez is an example of Situation (4).  While the Fourth 
Amendment did not extend in that case, the Court held that it is not 
necessarily the case that no provisions of the Bill of Rights could ever 
be applicable to non-U.S. nationals in situations involving conduct not 
in the United States.181 
III. THE PROPRIETY OF, AND BASIS FOR, EXTENDING 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 
The key issue surrounding these debates of whether to construe 
constitutional extensions formalistically or functionally rests on the 
question: What is the propriety of, and basis for, extending 
constitutional protections to foreign nationals abroad?  Rather, why 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2128 (“[B]y the 
accumulation of judicial and political precedent we have implicitly adopted a 
rebuttable presumption that noncitizens peacefully in the United States can claim the 
same constitutional protections for civil liberties as citizens.”). 
 179. See SPILLENGER, supra note 174, at 411. 
 180. See generally Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017). 
 181. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990). 
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restrict the extension of constitutional protections to citizens?182  The 
Court has used many different approaches, with no one prevailing 
theory.  These inconsistencies in rationales are reflected by the 
Insular Cases, Reid, and Verdugo-Urquidez.183 
The Supreme Court has found support for extending protections to 
foreign nationals under certain circumstances.  The War on Terror 
cases184 demonstrated the judicial receptiveness to extending 
constitutional guarantees to foreign nationals, even enemy 
combatants, and hold the Administration liable for attempts to 
circumvent the Constitution or the separation of powers principles.  
The Court went so far as to either discount the traditional 
considerations of citizenship and territoriality.185  This resulted in 
Boumediene, a controversial case for its adoption of the functional 
approach.  Additionally, promoting a global due process approach to 
constitutional rights fails for “its lack of textual anchor and its 
unpredictability.”186 
There are also arguments supporting the functional approach.  
These arguments are mostly based on morals and on the notion that 
people feel secure under the law by “[k]eeping  [the] U.S. as a zone of 
civil liberty for both citizens and noncitizens” and ensuring that “all 
humans have equal dignity.”187  This “equal dignity” argument has 
been prevalent among academics and advanced as a means of 
“balance[ing] liberty and security.”188  Furthermore, restricting the 
current functional approach or returning to a purely formalistic 
standard ignores the impact of globalization in exterritorial 
regulation, law enforcement, and information technology.189  
 
 182. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 981 (“Once the taboo 
against treating constitutional rights as effective beyond the nation’s boundaries has 
been overcome, the question arises whether this development should be restricted to 
citizens.”). 
 183. Id. at 975. 
 184. See supra Section I.D. See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 185. For a discussion of case law relying on citizenship considerations, territorial 
considerations, or a combination of both, see supra Section I.E. 
 186. See Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology, supra 
note 120, at 2083. 
 187. See Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2126, 2133. 
 188. See Cole, supra note 5, at 388 (noting that “we should respect the equal 
dignity and basic human rights of all persons”). 
 189. See Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology, supra 
note 120, at 2078. 
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Therefore, scholars promoting these arguments conclude that 
territoriality is “a poor fit in an increasingly interconnected world.”190 
However, these considerations are quickly dismissed, since the 
ability of the judiciary to consider these would likely lead to great 
judicial deference.191  The courts would be required to make 
“complex factual assessments and predictions about which rights 
would be workable to observe in which extraterritorial national 
security settings, untethered from any textual guidance.”192  This type 
of power lies outside the competence of the judiciary and could 
potentially hinder the government’s ability to react quickly and 
flexibly to sensitive matters.193  It is imperative that the Executive be 
given the latitude to swiftly respond to threats to U.S. national 
security.  But it does not follow that the government may act free of 
the Constitution under certain circumstances, as Boumediene 
demonstrated.  Nevertheless, there are some issues that Boumediene 
did not dispel. 
As mentioned, Boumediene created a vacuum, which resulted in a 
circuit split.  Currently, there are two approaches courts utilize when 
analyzing the geographic scope of the Constitution: (i) the “voluntary 
connections” test established in United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 
and (ii) the objective factor analysis of Boumediene v. Bush.194  These 
seemingly opposite approaches – the formalistic and functional 
interpretations, respectively — are problematic in that the Court has 
not been forceful in asserting which predominates.195  By the time the 
Supreme Court decided Hernandez, instead of embracing the 
opportunity to either promulgate an appropriate standard or 
affirmatively mandate either the formalistic or functional approach, it 
instead incorrectly applied Boumediene’s objective factor analysis 
and returned exclusively to Verdugo-Urquidez.196  Thus, by ignoring 
precedent, the Hernandez decision creates more inconsistencies in the 
lower courts, has “unfoundedly restricted, rather than expanded, the 
rights of foreign plaintiffs” from seeking relief under the Constitution, 
and “perpetuates a system of lawless law enforcement at the border at 
the expense of innocent human lives.”197 
 
 190. See Roosevelt III, supra note 90, at 2032. 
 191. See Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2131–32. 
 192. Id. at 2132. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See Botsaris, supra note 101, at 853. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See Rotstein, supra note 44, at 1400. 
 197. Id. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Globalization implies — if not mandates — harmonization: 
protecting due process with consistency, while simultaneously 
remaining wary of venturing too close to infringing on the sovereignty 
of other foreign states,198 respecting international comity, and 
observing jurisdictional barriers.  Therefore, an approach that allows 
U.S. agents to operate in a foreign state without any accountability is 
clearly not the solution.  In some instances, the Constitution must be 
applied abroad not only to extend protections to foreign nationals, 
but also to provide assurances that U.S. conduct will be subject to the 
constraints of the Constitution.  The result is two-fold: (1) extend 
constitutional protections to foreign nationals abroad, and (2) 
supplement those extensions with accountability and constraints when 
U.S. agents are acting abroad.  To accomplish this, the Supreme 
Court must settle the matter conclusively: whether the primary 
emphasis should be on territory or citizenship.199  This Essay argues 
that territory — albeit a more expansive definition of territory — is 
superior. 
The importance of the citizenship distinction is decreasing, as are 
the barriers of territory and enemy status as impediments to 
extraterritorial constitutional extensions.200  Consequently, the 
extension of protection is becoming more uniform throughout U.S. 
national security policies.201  But should the United States provide 
constitutional protections to all persons, regardless of citizenship, in 
the United States during times of peace?202  Should “the right to 
habeas corpus at the international level . . . be available to everyone, 
regardless of location or status”?203  The United States still needs 
some predictability and consistency — and this would likely be going 
too far.204 
It is incumbent on the courts to strike the right balance between 
the need to respond swiftly to national security threats, and the need 
 
 198. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 121 (“Having one sovereign intrude upon the 
domain of another was widely seen as not only wrong, but dangerous.”). 
 199. For a discussion of case law detracting emphasis away from enemy status and 
focusing instead on the prongs of citizenship and territory, see supra Section I.E. 
 200. See Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2135. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 2128. 
 203. See FARRELL, supra note 68, at 221 (emphasis added). 
 204. For a discussion of the most recent cases that provide either a functional 
approach for consistency or a formalistic approach for predictability, see supra 
Section I.C. 
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for flexibility in policies designed to ensure that due process rights are 
afforded to those the United States seeks to hold, detain, target, or 
regulate.  The “sufficient connections” test from Verdugo-Urquidez 
ignores territoriality to the point of denying constitutional extensions 
to areas where the United States exercises control but is not 
sovereign.205  Boumediene ignores both the situations where the 
conduct has occurred outside the de jure or de facto sovereignty of 
the United States and claimants with arguably sufficient connections 
to the United States.  However, neither approach is incorrect; 
territorial considerations require a more functional approach, while 
citizenship — or whether the claimant has sufficient connections to 
the United States — should take a more formalistic approach.  Thus, 
the solution is not to select a single approach; because these kinds of 
cases demand context-specific evaluation and solutions, one approach 
should function as a supplement the other. 
A. The Proposed Framework for Constitutional Protections 
An approach that analyzes the facts of each case using a clear, 
multi-step framework would promote consistency and predictability 
in judicial decision-making and administration.  Netta Rotstein 
advances a three-step balancing test regarding the Boumediene-
Verdugo-Urquidez debate: first, look to where the constitutional 
violation occurred; second, consider the appellant’s legal status under 
the “sufficient connections” test; and third, “evaluate the practical 
obstacles” of extending the constitutional guarantee.206  Distilled 
down to two steps, this Section proposes a framework that expands 
on Rotstein’s approach, as it: (1) allows for a consideration of de facto 
and de jure sovereignty when determining the territory of the United 
States for purposes of the place of the conduct; (2) provides an 
extended categorization of nationality to encompass those claimants 
who have attained sufficient connection to the territory — such as 
U.S. permanent legal residents; (3) limits extensions to those 
constitutional provisions already established by precedent; and (4) 
includes built-in safeguards where the specific constitutional 
guarantee does not extend extraterritorially under the framework, 
such as diplomatic relations and cooperation among states. 
 
 
 205. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 841–42 (2008). 
 206. See Rotstein, supra note 44, at 1392 (advancing this three-step framework to 
provide more consistency in the application of the Constitution abroad and to 
attempt to resolve the Boumediene-Verdugo-Urquidez debate). 
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This simplified framework recognizes the importance primarily of 
territory, and secondarily of nationality.  The territoriality prong at 
Step 1 is a more functional approach, since it embraces Boumediene’s 
expanded definition of territory.  This basis for asserting the relevant 
constitutional right is the expanded definition of territory as that 
which the United States has either de facto or de jure sovereignty.207  
Thus, the Guantanamo Bay cases would be resolved by Step 1; the 
Suspension Clause now appropriately extends to the detainees in 
Guantanamo.208  Similarly, if the area in question is not under the de 
facto or de jure sovereignty of the United States, like Mexico, then 
the specific constitutional guarantee will not be extended.209  If the 
constitutional guarantee is not reached at Step 1, then the analysis 
proceeds to Step 2, which addresses the nationality or connection of 
 
 207. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
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the claimant to the United States.210  Step 2 provides a more 
formalistic approach, since it would extend protections abroad only to 
U.S. nationals or permanent legal residents.  It is important not to be 
too subjective in this step with respect to what it means to have a 
sufficient connection.  Therefore, logically, only permanent legal 
residents of the United States would be able to satisfy the sufficient 
connection to the United States under Step 2.211 
Hernandez is perhaps the most challenging case to fit into the 
proposed framework.  On the one hand, the conduct at issue212 
occurred in the United States, with the effects taking place marginally 
outside U.S. territory.  On the other hand, Hernandez was not a U.S. 
national or a permanent legal resident of the United States.  
Following the proposed framework above precisely would lead to the 
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment should have been extended 
in favor of Hernandez, because the conduct took place on the U.S. 
side of the border.  Instead, the Supreme Court side-stepped the issue 
altogether by noting that extending the Fourth Amendment could 
have far-reaching consequences.213  Thus, lower courts are left 
without a clear standard to guide them when interpreting the 
geographic scope of these constitutional provisions under the facts of 
each case.214 
B. Reflections on the Proposed Framework and Other 
Considerations 
The United States does not occupy the same position it did over 
200 years ago.  The United states is now a global leader — 
economically, politically, and socially.  Most importantly, it is the 
home of a great diversity of people.215  A balance must be struck 
 
 210. Likewise, Step 2 also involves the cases involving Mexico.  For instance, the 
Constitution was not extended in Verdugo-Urquidez because the alleged illegal 
search took place in Mexico. 
 211. This step here is similar to the circumstances of Reid v. Covert, where the 
Constitution was extended in favor of U.S. nationals abroad. See 354 U.S. 1, 17 
(1957). 
 212. See Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 136 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 213. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017). 
 214. For a brief discussion of the circuit split after Hernandez, see supra Section 
I.E. 
 215. See Quick Facts: All Topics, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI225217#RHI225217 
[https://perma.cc/N3LP-DEW9]. As of 2017, the U.S. Census Bureau reports a 
population of 50.8% female.  Id. Race origins include White alone (non-Hispanic): 
60.7%; Asian alone: 5.8%; black or African American alone: 13.4%; and Hispanic or 
Latino: 18.1%. Id. 
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between retaining some degree of sovereignty for the United States 
and foreign states, and maintaining predictability in the Constitution’s 
application.  Courts should interpret the Constitution’s scope within 
the bounds of international law.216  This method of interpretation 
recognizes the inevitability of being part of a globalized world, the 
importance of flexibility to the Executive, and the need for 
consistency in the extension of certain constitutional provisions to 
claimants, particularly foreign claimants. 
It is important to recognize, however, that various checks on the 
extension of constitutional protections exist. For example, although 
the claimant in Verdugo-Urquidez likely had Fourth Amendment 
rights and those rights were likely violated,  it is also important to 
remember that Mexican officials did approve the search of Verdugo-
Urquidez’s apartment in Mexico.217  Thus, principles such as 
diplomatic relations can “check the degree to which the U.S. pursues 
criminal investigations abroad.”218 
Other checks that affect whether constitutional protections will be 
extended extraterritorially include “statutes, executive orders, and 
discretionary policy decision[s]” that are based on both “reciprocity 
[and] legitimacy.”219  These work to enable the protection of non-U.S. 
nationals, while also granting the U.S. government the requisite 
flexibility to take other action where necessary.220  Furthermore, such 
an approach encourages multi-lateral cooperation and coordination 
among states, as well as between the Legislature and Executive. 
Ultimately, the approach adopted should be one of fairness and 
practicality.  If one views the Constitution as a rigid document 
impervious to change, then the United States will be forced to justify 
its decisions with rationales that are outdated and ill-suited for a 
modern world.  This inflexible approach would undoubtedly hinder 
international cooperation and prevent “harmoniz[ation]” of 
“divergent national rules.”221  However, if one views the Constitution 
 
 216. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 189 (observing how “[e]xtraterritoriality was 
no longer limited to weak or peripheral states; it was now used against some of the 
most powerful states in the international system . . . ”). 
 217. See SPILLENGER, supra note 174, at 415. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2132. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 120–21 (while observing that “[t]he most 
familiar way to harmonize divergent national rules . . . is the negotiation of 
international agreements,” the United States’ “expansion of extraterritoriality in the 
postwar era is best understood as an alternative to more familiar cooperative 
efforts”). 
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as a living document that changes with every judicial opinion, every 
president, or every major political era, then its vitality and strength as 
a governing document of stability will be severely undermined.  This 
view subjects the United States to the whims of popular opinion.222  
Thus, the answer should lie between these two extreme ends. 
V. URBAN POLICY: FEDERAL INACTION AND THE PROBLEMS 
FACED BY STATES AND CITIES 
The Constitution’s reach has been extended to provide protections 
to U.S. nationals who were charged with crimes abroad and to cover 
foreign nationals within the territory of the United States.  It was 
logical for the Constitution to follow its nationals abroad and 
guarantee to them the same protections had they been within the 
territory of the United States.  It was similarly logical for the 
Constitution’s protections to extend to foreign nationals within the 
United States who had begun to form a bond with the territory, utilize 
its resources, and contribute to its development.  But if these 
extensions are accepted as logical, then how can opinions such as 
Verdugo-Urquidez or Hernandez be justified? 
States and cities can – and should – play a role in resolving this 
issue. Change often starts small, and begins locally, before a more 
sweeping national movement can be advanced.  States and 
municipalities occupy a uniquely powerful position as actors, given 
their ability to understand, and respond to, particular local realities, 
given their proximity to the people. 
Some maintain that state governments should be involved in 
determining and facilitating the extension of constitutional 
protections, because both the Constitution and the principles of 
federalism grant them that right. For instance, states have “sovereign 
rights regarding the treatment of individuals within their borders”; 
they can make autonomous law enforcement decisions to promote 
public safety.223  The Constitution carves out space for the states to 
 
 222. Id. at 216 (noting that Boumediene’s focus on practicality, for example, 
implies that constitutional issues are not fixed in time and that certain factors are 
“subject to change given technological and political developments” and that “[w]hat 
was impractical one day might become practical in a future day”). 
 223. Cara Cunningham Warren, Sanctuary Lost? Exposing the Reality of the 
Sanctuary-City Debate and Liberal States- Rights Litigation, 63WAYNE L. REV. 155, 
171 (2018). 
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exercise police power.224  Each state has a legitimate interest in 
protecting and promoting the health and safety of all residents within 
its jurisdiction; this naturally includes those undocumented 
noncitizens residing within a state’s borders.225 
But state-centric solutions may not be feasible. Under the doctrine 
of preemption, federal law governs the entire field of immigration, 
based on expressed congressional intent to do so.226  Should states 
attempt to bypass federal law, they will likely be met with hostility.227  
On the other hand, it is difficult for Congress to develop a 
comprehensive immigration plan that considers the varying 
circumstances of those it will encompass via its regulatory scope.  If 
Congress will not act, and the states are either forbidden from or 
interrupted in proactively taking the first step, it is hard to imagine 
how and whether consistency in the Constitution’s administration will 
be achieved.  Additionally, states are not themselves immune from 
the effects of the sharp political divide in the United States today, 
which presents one of the greatest hurdles to making serious plans for 
extended and harmonized constitutional guarantees.228  Invariably, 
state efforts to deal with these problems have fallen short.  Localities 
have responded by taking matters into their own hands and serving as 
sanctuary cities, declaring themselves as safe-havens for immigrants 
and guardians of the rights of “outsiders.”  Sanctuary city laws are 
“designed to embrace a diverse and inclusive vision of community.”229  
Sanctuary cities are a prominent example of how local jurisdictions 
have resisted the enforcement of federal immigration laws.  Many 
localities see sanctuary as necessary to prevent harm to their 
communities, as well as to express their disagreement with federal 
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immigration policies.230  Local efforts to provide protection to 
vulnerable foreign nationals in a particular jurisdiction has also been 
grounded in the rationale that immigration is inherently a local 
matter: namely, policies to protect immigrants “preserve local 
sovereignty, define local priorities, and enhance community trust in 
law enforcement.”231 
But as cities promote sanctuary policies, there has been 
simultaneous legislation to strip the states of federal funding.232  This 
is further evidence of the “deepening divide” between the federal, 
state, and local governments and the American people regarding the 
issue of unauthorized immigration.233 Despite these tensions, states 
and cities continue to push back, motivated by the “concern that 
entangling police with immigration enforcement erodes trust among 
minority community members,” the “commitment to preventing 
improper discrimination in policing based on race, ethnicity, or 
national origin, and the “wish to express disagreement with federal 
immigration policy.”234  Therefore, it is evident that a comprehensive 
analysis of U.S. immigration law requires recognition of the role 
played not only by the federal government, but by proactive non-
federal stakeholders – “states, cities, individuals, and other private 
actors.”235 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has presented an in-depth analysis of trends in the 
rationales of the U.S. Supreme Court when deciding the geographic 
scope of the Constitution as applied to U.S. and foreign nationals.  
The Court’s approach to the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution 
has changed, with earlier cases adopting an approach based on 
territorialism, followed by considerations of the claimant’s citizenship.  
Recent cases tend to ground their holdings in domestic concerns, such 
as the separation of powers or national security matters.  This is 
particularly evident in the wake of 9/11, with the War on Terror cases.  
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However, the measures taken by the executive and legislative 
branches have been too extensive and arguably intrusive in the era of 
the War on Terror. 
It has been unclear whether the determinative factor in judicial 
analyses for extraterritorial extensions of the Constitution should be 
based on territory or citizenship.  The uncertainty peaked with 
Hernandez, because the Court obviated any consideration of 
reciprocity by avoiding a resolution of constitutional issues altogether.  
Cases involving Guantanamo Bay and the United States-Mexico 
border have been, and continue to be, the subject of significant 
controversy. Scholars continue to struggle as to whether a formalistic 
approach is superior over the functional approach. 
This Essay promotes a balanced approach to account for present-
day realities: a combination of Verdugo-Urquidez’s formalistic 
approach and Boumediene’s functional approach.  Context matters. 
Territory is the single-most significant consideration that the Supreme 
Court needs to evaluate.  A combination of these theories supports 
consistency in the application of the Constitution abroad, provides a 
clear standard for lower courts to follow, gives the Executive its 
needed flexibility in dealing with national security matters, respects 
foreign states’ sovereignty by avoiding unnecessary infringements, 
and affords foreign claimants the fair administration of certain 
constitutional guarantees. 
